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Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a
New (Pragmatist) Middle in
Environmental Law
ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD by Daniel A. Farber. University of Chicago Press
1999. Pp 224. $23.00.
J.B. Ruhl*
Introduction
Cosmologists believe that immediately after the Universe's inflationary
epoch, roughly 10-35 seconds after the Big Bang, matter and anti-matter be-
gan to annihilate each other.' Fortunately, there was more matter than anti-
matter and, as they say, the rest is history. The point, however, is that about
three minutes into its existence, the Universe consisted entirely of the rem-
nants of a war between two opposites. It has made what it could of itself
since then, but by no means does the cosmological theory posit that the final
"compromise" between matter and anti-matter derived from any a priori
sense of how the middle ground should look.
* Professor, The Florida State University College of Law, Tallahassee, Florida. I am in-
debted to Professors Robert Glicksman and Sidney Shapiro not only for their helpful comments,
but also for allowing me to review early drafts of parts of their work in progress book manuscript
on pragmatic approaches to risk regulation, REGULATION AT RISK: RESTOINo A PRAGMATIC
APPROACH. Please direct comments to jruhl@law.fsu.edu.
1 See Rick Gore, The Once and Future Universe, NAT'L. GEOGRAPHIc, June 1983, at 704,
740; STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HIsTORY OF TIME 117 (1988).
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I feel the same way about environmental law. Since almost immediately
after its statutory big bang in the early 1970s,2 two extreme and opposing
philosophies-one devoted to protecting the economy and the other to pro-
tecting the environment-have waged a war of annihilation that has left in its
wake the mish-mash of laws, regulations, judicial opinions, and countless ad-
ministrative decisions and policies that we today call environmental law.
Any notion that the remnant heap of rules represents a reasoned "middle
ground" of political deliberation is utterly naive. As one classic discussion of
the origins of the National Environmental Policy Act illustrates 3 the "mid-
dle" in environmental law is simply whatever the annihilation process leaves
behind, and environmental "moderates" are those who fall somewhere be-
tween moderately unhappy and moderately pleased with the outcome (the
two extremes are always extremely unhappy, and no one is ever extremely
happy). Hence, even though this process accounts for most of what we call
environmental law, it does not result in a deliberate position. With few ex-
ceptions, the middle ground in environmental law has no agenda, no theme,
no way of thinking. This is because "the middle" in environmental law lacks
any coherent philosophy.
In Eco-pragmatism,4 Daniel Farber, a leading academic figure in envi-
ronmental law5 and several other fields,6 offers his version of what the middle
in environmental law has failed to define for itself-a philosophy of how it
should look and act. To do so, Farber impliedly marries two emerging
themes of the environment. The first theme is scientifically based and fo-
cuses on new understandings of the dynamic nature of ecological functions
and how we should manage our human affairs to take full advantage of them
over the long run. The other theme, philosophically oriented, extracts itself
from the positivist foundations of the annihilation process to offer a new spe-
2 Described as the "explosion of environmental law," from 1970 through 1976, in quick
order Congress newly enacted or substantially amended ten major environmental regulation
statutes covering air, water, land pollution, project planning, workplace safety, manufacturing,
species protection, and public drinking water. See J. William Futrell, The History of Environ-
mental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FROM RESOURCES TO
RECOVERY §1.2(I)(1)-(3), at 35-39 (1993) (collecting statutes); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 105-10 (3d ed. 2000) (same). Congress nearly duplicated that
record during the same period in the field of natural resources protection. See Futrell, supra,
§ 1.2(I)(4), at 39-40, 48 (collecting statutes). The process continued into the 1980s, albeit at a
slower pace. See PERCIVAL, supra, at 107-12 (collecting statutes). For an excellent history of
how one field of environmental protection law transformed during this shift from common law
to public law, see Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Legislative History of U.S. Air Pollution Control, 36
Hous. L. REV. 679 (1999).
3 See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward'a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization
of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326-38 (1985) (describing in detail the "com-
petitive credit claiming" behavior of opposing presidential aspirants as being the central force
that opened the door to NEPA and the ensuing statutory revolution in environmental law).
4 Daniel A. Farber, Eco-pragmatism (1999).
5 For example, Farber is co-author of a leading and time-tested casebook on environmen-
tal law. See ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW (5th ed. 1999).
6 Farber is also co-author of a leading casebook on constitutional law. See DANIEL A.
FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTrrU-
TION'S THIRD CENTURY (2d ed. 1998).
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cies of environmental philosophy, one based at its roots on classical Ameri-
can pragmatism. When fused, ecological dynamism and environmental
pragmatism form "eco-pragmatism, ' '7 a new approach to making environ-
mental decisions in an uncertain world.
I say Farber impliedly fuses these two themes because Eco-pragmatism
supplies only his end-product prescriptions for eco-pragmatism. One disap-
pointing quality of the book is the lack of any effort to build the theory up
from the important work that has unfolded in ecosystem science and environ-
mental pragmatism philosophy, a gap I attempt to shore up in this review
only to show the solid grounding that Farber's insightful approach has in
these modem developments.
For example, consistent with those trends in ecosystem science and envi-
ronmental philosophy, Farber sells eco-pragmatism as a new decision making
philosophy for environmental law, not a new normative theory of correct
outcomes. Indeed, he does not suggest that the political annihilation process
landed environmental law in a radically different place than eco-pragmatism
would have found. Of course, one might reasonably ask why all the philo-
sophical fuss is worth the time if the outcomes are close to the same either
way. To respond, I must rely on my cosmological metaphor once again. Re-
call that, as it turned out, there was more matter than anti-matter, so the
annihilation process came to an end. I, for one, am not sure that the annihi-
lation process in environmental law will ever come to an end as long as it is
framed by two opposing philosophies and a vacuum in the middle and,
frankly, I am sick of it. Even more so, if the environmental policy wars ever
do come to an end, presumably because one side outlasts the other, I fear
living under either extreme. Eco-pragmatism may not radically change the
way environmental law looks; rather, I expect it will change the way we get
there. That is enough for me to have found value in Eco-pragmatism. I be-
lieve, however, that there is more to be said on behalf of eco-pragmatism
than is found in Eco-pragmatism, and I expect the extremists at both ends
will soon be crawling all over it as anathema to their respective agendas.8
Thus, I offer these observations on both the book and the philosophy.
7 Ironically, although Farber tells us early in his book that he wrote it to "argue for a
pragmatic approach to environmental law," see Eco-PRAGMArIsM, supra note 4, at 9, he does
not use the term "eco-pragmatism" until the conclusion of the book, see id. at 201.
8 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Too Pragmatic By Half, 109 YALE L. J. 1639, 1665-67
(2000) (assigning Eco-pragmatism a mixed review-it does not "fall prey to the excesses of en-
vironmentalism," but also does not sufficiently take into account the strengths of free market
environmentalism); Lisa Heinzerling, Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARv. L. REv.
1421 (2000) (concluding that Farber's pragmatic environmentalism is not sufficiently transforma-
tive); David Roe, Green Scholarship, 3 GREEN BAG 2d 97 (1999) (offering a decidedly unfavora-
ble review of Eco-pragmatism on a variety of bases); see also Paul Boudreaux, Environmental
Costs, Benefits, and Values: A Review of Daniel A. Farber's Eco-pragmatism, 13 TULANE ENVTL.
L. J. 125 (1999) (faulting Eco-pragmatism for lack of detail but approving of its approach). It is
not my purpose to respond to these reviews; Farber has done so in at least one instance. See
Daniel A. Farber, Green Scholarship-An Oxymoron?, 3 GREEN BAG 2d 231 (2000) (responding
to Roe, supra).
[Vol 68:522
HeinOnline  -- 68 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 524 1999-2000
2000] Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle525
I. Emerging Fronts in Environmental Science and Philosophy
At the risk of being accused of judging a book by its cover, I will dwell
for a moment on Farber's title and what lies behind it in terms of environ-
mental science and philosophy. The title Eco-pragmatism suggests to me the
fusion of two components, the eco and the pragmatism, into a unified ap-
proach to environmental decision making. Farber devotes few pages, how-
ever, to exploring the scientific and philosophical foundations to prepare
these two parts for the marriage Eco-pragmatism performs. Indeed, it is only
within the last decade that those foundations solidly appeared, in the form of
a greater scientific understanding of how dynamically the environment func-
tions and a more developed explication of how the philosophy of pragmatism
responds to that scientific revelation. To fully evaluate Farber's message,
therefore, it is useful to retrace the beginnings of these two disciplines. I
cannot do full justice to either of these two streams of thought here. I can
demonstrate, however, how their convergent paths lead to the kind of ap-
proach to environmental law that Farber describes in Eco-pragmatism.
A. Ecosystem Science
If we understand eco to mean "a combining form representing ecology in
the formation of compounds,"9 and deferring for the moment what pragma-
tism means, one could reasonably expect that Eco-pragmatism would include
some exposition on ecology to illuminate what eco brings to the marriage. It
does not. Late in the book-the second to last page in fact-Farber tells us
that, whereas traditional theories of the environment portrayed nature in a
delicate balance, "the current teaching of ecologists is that this picture is all
wrong. Nature is not in an equilibrium; it is in a constant state of change.
The old picture of the 'balance of nature' simply does not correspond to real-
ity."'10 From that scientific position, which Farber simply expects us to take as
a given, he offers a policy approach that represents the eco in eco-
pragmatism:
There are two lessons here: we need to think of human society as
firmly embedded in nature, and we need to think of nature as a flux
rather than a balance. So environmentalism cannot take the form
of a "Berlin wall" keeping humans out and the animals in. Instead,
we must envision long-term connections between humans and na-
ture, requiring continual change and adaptation on both sides.1
Nothing Farber says in this passage would draw the ire of modem ecolo-
gists, but saving it for page 205 of a 206-page book and presenting only the
bottom line does not strike me as putting eco's best foot forward. There is so
much more to say on this topic, and although it does not all need to be said in
Eco-pragmatism, I for one would like to have seen more of it said, and
sooner.
9 Random House Dictionary of the English Language 618 (2d ed. unabridged 1987).
10 Eco-pragmatism, supra note 4, at 205.
'1 Id.
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Taking Farber's two end points in reverse order, "nature as flux" corre-
sponds with the rapidly developing science of ecosystem dynamics, and
"human society as firmly embedded in nature" corresponds with the emerg-
ing policy discipline of ecosystem management. The first has led to the sec-
ond, as the new science trend increasingly has built a compelling case for new
policy approaches. Both developments define today's use of eco so much in
science and policy circles that a full appreciation of Eco-pragmatism is diffi-
cult without the background.
1. Ecosystem Dynamics
Charles Darwin focused the scientific community's attention on the im-
portance of ecological contexts with the publication of his works on natural
selection beginning in 1859,12 though the term ecology did not surface until
later13 and the science of ecology did not begin in earnest before 1890.14 The
Oxford ecologist, Sir Alfred George Tansley, first introduced the term
"ecosystem" in 1935 to describe the basic functional unit in the study of ecol-
ogy.' 5 The idea stuck, and through the efforts of ecologists such as Eugene P.
Odum in the 1950s, ecosystem theory evolved into the building block of mod-
em ecological research.'
6
With ecosystems firmly embedded as the subject matter of ecology, our
understanding and description of their functions and sustaining forces influ-
ences how we design policy and law to manage them. Odum subscribed to
the "homeostasis" view of ecosystems, positing that much like the growth of
individual organisms toward a homeostatic state,
equilibrium between organisms and environment may also be main-
tained by factors which resist change in the system as a whole.
Much has been written about this 'balance of nature' but only with
the recent development of good methods for measuring rates of
function of whole systems has a beginning been made in the under-
standing of the mechanisms involved.17
As it turned out, however, the beginning to which Odum referred, pro-
pelled by the advent of the high-speed computer, led to research that sur-
passes the homeostasis thesis and forged the theory of nature as flux.18
12 See CHARLEs DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION
(Hurst 1859). For an explanation of the importance of Darwin's work to the founding of the
science of ecology, see JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH 225-27 (1994).
13 Ernst Haeckel, the German Darwinist, coined the term as a companion to his theories
of ontogeny and phylogeny. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, EVER SINCE DARWIN 119 (1977).
14 For an excellent lawyers' history of the discipline of ecology and the role the concept of
ecosystem has played in it, see Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of the Eco-
logical Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 847, 849-870 (1994).
See also Jory Ruggiero, Toward a Law of the Land: The Clean Water Act as a Federal Mandate
for the Implementation of an Ecosystem Approach to Land Management, 20 PUB. LAND & RE-
SOURCES L. REv. 31, 31-41 (1999).
15 See Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 14, at 861.
16 See id. at 861-63.
17 Id. at 866 (quoting EUGENE P. ODUM & HOWARD T. ODUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOL-
OGY 25 (2d ed. 1959)).
18 See id. at 869-71.
[Vol 68:522
HeinOnline  -- 68 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 526 1999-2000
2000] Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle527
According to this new view, the richness and diversity of ecological systems
in the environment will forever defy our full grasp, as they are "continually in
flux and exhibit a wondrous panoply of interactions such as mutualism, para-
sitism, biological arms races, and mimicry .... Matter, energy, and informa-
tion are shunted around in complex cycles." 19 In other words, the
environment operates in a state of highly complicated organized disorder.
Indeed, scientists are beginning to understand that the disorder-the chaos
that is inherent in the environment-is its means of sustainability.
20
This revelation explains both the appeal and the folly of the "nature in
balance" thesis. As noted biologist Simon Levin stated, "[it may well be that
natural systems are not so very fragile .... What is fragile, however, is the
maintenance of the services on which humans depend."' Humans, in other
words, want nature to stay in a stable state so that they can continue to derive
what they want from it-food, water, wood, minerals, flood control, and so
on. The "nature in balance" view simply imprints that human value on na-
ture, portraying the inevitable change humans cause as disruptions to na-
ture's fragile balance and suggesting that if humans are really careful-if they
treat nature gingerly-they can perpetually live off the services that nature's
stable-state ecosystems deliver. The "nature as flux" view reverses that
model: nature will change, relentlessly, with or without humans. Humans
might accelerate, decelerate, or otherwise alter the changes, but humans will
be sorely disappointed if they depend on nature to stay still while they reap
the benefits. This is Farber's eco in theory.
2. Ecosystem Management
As hard as it was to learn the pointlessness of trying to prevent nature
from changing, ecologists concur that it will be harder still to learn how to
change with nature-to continue to adapt our ways of deriving value from
nature while it changes, and to do this without undermining the sources of
those values. As Levin explains, the "nature as flux" view counsels that:
[t]o manage the Earth's systems and ensure our survival, we have to
harness the natural forces that organize the biosphere rather than
fruitlessly try to resist them. The biosphere is a complex adaptive
system whose essential structure has emerged in large part from
adaptive changes that were mediated at local levels rather than at
the level of the whole system. Humanity's program must therefore
be to understand those changes, the forces that have shaped them,
and their consequences at the larger level, and then to put that
knowledge to work in determining where the pressure points are for
effecting changes that will preserve critical ecosystem services.
22
19 JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: How ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXrTY 3
(1995).
20 See id. at 4, 27-29.
21 SIMON LEvIN, FRAGILE DOMINION: COMPLExrrY AND THE COMMrONs 15 (1999).
Levin's book has already received high acclaim, having been described as a "lucid and compel-
ling tour through the current intellectual landscape of ecology and environmental science."
Robert May, How the Biosphere is Organized, 286 Sci. 2091 (1999).
22 FRAGILE DOMINION, supra note 21, at 15.
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The new take on ecosystem dynamics thus leads directly to the new policy of
ecosystem management as an emerging force in environmental policy and
law.23
Threads of scientific research and commentary consistent with this
ecosystem management theme extend back into the 1980s, but until the early
1990s, writers did not routinely use the phrase "ecosystem management" as a
commonly accepted term of art. For example, the current scientific literature
on ecosystem management rarely cites to books and articles published before
1990.2 One of the formative scientific writings on the subject, cited in virtu-
ally every subsequently published treatment, is from 1994.25 The flagship
journal on the topic, Conservation Biology, is only in its fourteenth volume.
On the other hand, the number of writings focused on ecosystem man-
agement has exploded in this short amount of time. A recent article that
attempts to synthesize many of the themes of ecosystem management com-
mentary cites over 100 scientific books and articles with publication dates
after 1990.26 This volume of publications-more importantly, the variety of
scientific journals willing to publish writings on the theme of ecosystem man-
agement-indicates that ecosystem management has become an important
and widely discussed idea. Ecosystem management may be a relatively new
idea, but it has arrived with a bang.
Although there is much flesh to be put on the bones of the ecosystem
management idea, its normative thrust is unmistakably clear and nearly
unanimously held27 by those advocating ecosystem management principles in
general-i.e., environmental and land management decision makers must
center their decisions around the concept of constantly evolving ecosystem
functions. 8 Ecosystem management has quickly become a coordinating
habitat conservation policy for many federal, state, and local agencies as well
as private conservation groups.29 Indeed, broader policy agendas extend
"systems management" thinking in environmental law well beyond habitat
23 For a recent treatment of the relation between advancement of ecology research and its
use in ecosystem management policy, see John M. Blair et al., Ecosystems as Functional Units in
Nature, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 150 (2000).
24 In searches of electronic databases, I turned up 61 scientific books with the term
"ecosystem management" or something close to it in the title, the vast majority of which were
published after 1990. Law follows suit: of 36 law journal articles with "ecosystem management"
in the title, all were published after 1990.
25 See R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOL-
ooY 27 (1994).
26 See Steven L. Yaffee, Three Faces of Ecosystem Management, 13 CONSERVATION BIOL-
OGY 713 (1999).
27 Despite this consensus, some authors contend that ecosystem management policy is a
misguided exercise in nature worship and fuzzy science. See ALAN K. Frr-sIMMONS, DEFENDING
ILLUSIONS: FEDERAL PROTECTION OF EcosYsTEMs 1-16 (1999).
28 For an extended discussion of how ecosystem management principles can be applied in
concrete legal settings, see Ruggiero, supra note 14, at 44-77 (discussing the use of ecosystem
management in water quality protection laws).
29 See STEVEN L. YAFFEE Er AL., ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
(1996) (reviewing 105 ecosystem management projects and providing information on an addi-
tional 500).
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conservation. 30 Environmental law scholarship has quickly embraced this
new policy thrust and its underlying "nature as flux" view.31 It has worked its
way into law school casebooks. 32 It has recently, albeit very cautiously, even
begun to find form in law to apply.33 Although science started the ball rolling
with the shift to the "nature as flux" model, the challenge now is to "pioneer
the practical implementation of an ecosystem approach. '34 This is Farber's
eco in action.
B. Environmental Pragmatism
Notwithstanding the top billing eco enjoys, Farber unmistakably intends
pragmatism to be an equal partner in the union. By limiting his treatment to
the end product, however, Farber provides little insight into pragmatism's up-
bringing and what it offers for eco. What do we know about the philosophi-
cal mate Farber has chosen for eco? How do we know it is good enough for
our cherished eco?
Farber tells us that pragmatism is born of "a broader movement in legal
scholarship, which is sometimes called practical reasoning or legal pragma-
tism. ' 35 Farber, who has written extensively about legal pragmatism else-
where,36 gives us but a scattered bottom-line primer in Eco-pragmatism. It
involves, he explains, "a rejection of the view that rules, in and of themselves,
dictate outcomes," relying instead on "the use of theories, but as tools, not as
ends in themselves. '37 Theories become "mediating principles to guide deci-
sion making" and part of a "framework that leaves us open to the unique
attributes of each case, without losing track of our more general normative
commitments. '38 In this way, pragmatism takes advantage of "the usefulness
of combining concrete examples with more abstract forms of reasoning.
'39
Hence, to conclude his tutorial, Farber assures us that, far from being "inter-
30 See, e.g., THINKING ECOLOGICALLY (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997).
31 See, e.g., Symposium, Beyond the Balance of Nature: Environmental Law Faces the New
Ecology, 7 DuKE ErrTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1 (1996); Symposium, Ecology and the Law, 69 CHL-
KENT L. REv. 847 (1994).
32 See, e.g., FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND
POLICY 54-70 (3d ed. 1999).
33 See Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN.
L. REV. 869 (1997) (surveying ecosystem management principles as applied under the Endan-
gered Species Act, National Forest Management Act, and other resource protection statutes);
Symposium, Ecosystem Management, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 147 (2000) (explaining cur-
rent role of ecosystem management in a variety of legal settings).
34 Jamie Rappaport Clark, The Ecosystem Approach from a Practical Point of View, 13
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 679, 679 (1999) (calling for, as Director of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice, the union of ecosystem dynamics science and ecosystem management policy in the adminis-
tration of the Endangered Species Act).
35 ECO-PRAGMATISM, supra note 4, at 9.
36 See id. at 9 n.22 (citing some of Farber's other works). See also Daniel A. Farber, Par-
ody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic History of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REv. 397
(1997); Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century,
1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 163; Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MnIN. L.
REv. 1331 (1988).
37 ECO-PRAGMATISM, supra note 4, at 10.
38 Id. at 11.
39 Id. at 15.
HeinOnline  -- 68 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 529 1999-2000
The George Washington Law Review
changeable with ad hoc balancing," legal pragmatism "weighs all the fac-
tors.., and then tries to make a good decision in any given case. '40
Is that it? Can we move from that quick summary immediately to ques-
tions as deep and overarching as how to discount the loss of future human
lives or which species to allow to go extinct? I think that may be rushing the
courtship a bit. My concern is that Farber is expecting too much of readers
who are not well versed in legal pragmatism philosophy but whom Farber
wishes to convince that his happy union between eco and pragmatism will
last. His summary of the core values of legal pragmatism would make any
pragmatist proud, but it fails to convey the richness of pragmatist philosophy,
particularly that of the emerging stream of environmental pragmatism philos-
ophy. It is this environmental pragmatism that demonstrates why those core
values are the right starting point for modem environmental issues.
The foundation of Farber's pragmatism begins with the patron saints of
classical American pragmatism-figures such as Charles Pierce, William
James, Josiah Royce, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, and their contem-
poraries who began forging the theory in the late 1800s. 41 These pragmatists
did not write with what we think of today as environmental issues in mind
because pragmatists grapple with real-world problems, and environmental is-
sues were not paramount in that regard at the dawn of American pragma-
tism. Rather they focused generally on the connectivity of the
environment-using that term in the broadest sense-with the human expe-
rience, and their work embedded a rich texture of environmental foundations
into the pragmatist thesis. Today, some modem environmental philosophers,
many of whose work can be found in Andrew Light's and Eric Katz's path-
breaking book Environmental Pragmatism,42 have tapped into those founda-
tions in ways remarkably consistent with Farber's use of legal pragmatism to
shape modern environmental law.
The principle common to this entire body of work and Farber's brief
summation is the rejection of positivist philosophies of the environment.
Thus, where Farber rejects the view that rules in and of themselves dictate
outcomes, he echoes American pragmatists' conviction that "attempts to set
down the 'final word' on what is right have a disturbing tendency to show up
as incomplete, ambiguous or quaintly archaic in the next generation," 43 and
finds good company in those modem environmental pragmatists who are
"highly critical of any notion of absolutes in either knowledge or metaphys-
ics."'44 Indeed, to the extent that battling positivist theories frame issues, as
Farber says is the case in modern environmental policy, pragmatism often
40 Id. at 93.
41 Farber elsewhere has drawn the connection between legal pragmatism and its roots in
the work of these early American pragmatist philosophers. See Farber, Legal Pragmatism and
the Constitution, supra note 36, at 1337 "("This term legal pragmatism.., highlights the connec-
tion between the new turn in legal thought and the American pragmatist philosophers.").
42 ANDREW LIGHT & ERIC KA'rz, ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM (1996).
43 Kelly A. Parker, Pragmatism and Environmental Thought, in ENVIRONMENTAL PRAO-
MATISM, supra note 42, at 21, 26.
44 Andrew Light & Eric Katz, Introduction: Environmental Pragmatism and Environmen-
tal Ethics.as Contested Terrain, in ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM, supra note 42, at 1, 7.
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leads to a striving for "metatheoretical compatibilism between the opposing
theories.
'45
Pragmatism thus rejects moral foundationalism and assumes moral plu-
ralism, an important point for those interested in modem environmental pol-
icy. As Katz and Light observe, one of the troubling features of modem
environmental ethics scholarship is the speed with which it reached the "nar-
row predisposition that only a small set of approaches in the field is worth-
while," such that the only "adequate and workable environmental ethics
must embrace non-anthropocentrism, holism, moral monism, and, perhaps, a
commitment to some form of intrinsic value. '46 Pragmatism, by contrast,
"maintains that no set of ethical concepts can be the absolute foundation for
evaluating the rightness of our actions."
47
So where does environmental pragmatism philosophy, with its anathema
to positivist, rule-driven decisions and moral monism, lead environmental
policy? Here we turn to Farber's notion of theories as guidelines tested by
complex experiences. This approach is also well represented in classical
pragmatist theory and the emerging environmental pragmatism philosophy.
Central in the pragmatist method is a willingness to test and discard theory
where it does not fit the experience, rather than try to shape outcomes to fit
the theory. Thus, classical American pragmatism emphasized a "practice
over theory" approach in which "attention to the specific context of action
reveals a methodology explicitly pragmatic, in that practice preceded the de-
velopment of theory. ' 48 Extending that theme to the modem environmental
policy context, one of the new environmental pragmatists summarizes the
sharp distinction between positivist and pragmatist approaches to theory and
experience: "[t]he positivists are thus deductive, moving from theory to the
development of hypothesis in order to study a particular problem, while
pragmatists are inductive, moving from a complex problem to a general the-
ory of understanding in order to improve a given situation. '49 From this, it is
easy to appreciate the appeal of pragmatism to environmental philosophers,
for "environmental topics are conducive to such applied goals, because natu-
ral resources management, environmental policy, and agricultural land use
invite practical action.
50
In that applied approach exists another core theme of pragmatism rele-
vant to the modem environmental context: the absolute rejection of the Car-
tesian theory of dualistic mind-matter or human-environment domains.
Dewey in particular hammered away at dualism's spectator theory with his
view that "nature, as a complex of objects of knowledge, is neither complete
in itself apart from humans, nor the locus of extra-human deliberation." 51
45 Id. at 11.
46 Id. at 2.
47 Parker, supra note 43, at 26.
48 Light & Katz, supra note 44, at 10.
49 Leslie Aileen Durham, Taking a Pragmatic Behavioral Approach to Alternative Agricul-
ture Research, 13 AM. J. ALTERNATIVE AGRIC. 92, 93 (1998).
50 Id.
51 Larry A. Hickman, Nature as Culture: John Dewey's Pragmatic Naturalism, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL PRAGMATISM, supra note 42, at 50, 53.
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This is the legacy the classical American pragmatists handed to the modern
environmental pragmatists, for it rocks the anti-anthropomorphic view that
dominates today's narrow-minded environmental ethics. Thus, environmen-
tal pragmatism is "anthropometric" in that all environmental values-or all
the environmental values that count-are those that derive from the human
experience, about which humans converse, and which only humans mea-
sure.52 This is why almost all pragmatists emphasize the importance of eco-
nomic theory as the social science of human values but require that it be
considered alongside the other natural and social sciences as one of many
useful tools of analysis of the human-environment experience.
53
As explained above, the classical American pragmatists offered no con-
crete examples of how to carry out this approach in environmental contexts.
That has been the work of Light, Katz, and fellow environmental pragmatism
philosophers-to translate Dewey and his kind for today's environmental
policy. Here we find out just how good a match pragmatism is for eco. In
what could pass for the title of an ecosystem management manual, environ-
mental pragmatists tell us that natural resource management policy must be
"pluralistic, pragmatic and evolutionary." 54 To meet these goals, the policy
must provide for economic and social change, recognize the interdependence
of organisms and processes both within ecosystems and between humans and
nature, consider intergenerational consequences of today's decisions, and use
adaptive decision making processes.55 Hence, contrary to the environmental-
ists' creed, economic consequences count, but, contrary to the economists'
creed, they have their limitations in shaping policy.5 6 Policy management
under environmental pragmatism is, in other words, working both positivist
ends toward a new pragmatist middle.
I. Bridging the Positivist Chasm in Environmental Law
The preceding excursion into the leading edges of environmental science
and philosophy helps to illustrate the contribution Farber has made in staking
out the new middle ground in environmental law. Ecosystem management
(eco) and environmental pragmatism (pragmatism) stand on their own legs
and seem to make a nice pair, but neither stream of thought has yet offered
much insight into how to incorporate themselves into the legal system. As
noted above, ecosystem management has only recently made inroads, small
inroads, into legal text, and even devout environmental pragmatists bemoan
that they "seem to have no real impact on the deliberations of environmental
scientists, activists and policy-makers. '57 Someone has to take eco-pragma-
tism seriously in order to create a new definition of "the middle" in environ-
mental law; a definition that does not merely accept the remains from the
52 See Parker, supra note 43, at 33.
53 See Emery N. Castle, A Pluralistic, Pragmatic and Evolutionary Approach to Natural
Resource Management, in ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM, supra note 42, at 246-48.
54 Id. at 231, 247.
55 See id. at 233-34.
56 See id at 248.
57 Light & Katz, supra note 44, at 1.
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battles between the ends, but rather defines itself through the pragmatist
method.
A. The Familiar Positivist Ends: Bean Counters vs. Tree Huggers
Step one in the process of making eco-pragmatism legally relevant is
exposing the positivist origins of our existing "political annihilation" ap-
proach to defining the middle ground in environmental law. True to spirit of
the American pragmatists, albeit without -drawing directly from their work,
Eco-pragmatism does as good a job at this as can be found anywhere in envi-
ronmental law literature. Indeed, perhaps eager for the fight, Farber starts
the book by painting a vivid picture of two warring clans:
Some people seem to think these questions have simple answers.
One approach that promises such answers is cost-benefit analysis
.... At the other end of the spectrum from cost-benefit analysis are
those who believe that public health and environmental quality are
paramount, much like constitutional rights such as free speech.58
Farber experiments with several ways of illustrating this dichotomy. He
caricaturizes the division as one "between 'tree huggers,' who hold the envi-
ronment sacred and reject economic values as profane, and 'bean counters,'
who believe only in values that can be quantified in dollars and cents."59 At
a deeper level, Farber explains, the tree huggers are really the environmental
version of neo-republicanism, eschewing the individualistic tool of the mar-
ket for pluralistic political institutions that integrate public values, such as the
environment, into decision making.60 Their ultimate metric for environmen-
tal policy is "willingness to vote."'61 The bean counters, by contrast, cling to
the view that economic efficiency, as mediated by the market, is the measure
of social welfare, requiring that we assess all environmental decisions accord-
ing to relative cost and benefit.62 Their ultimate metric for environmental
policy is "willingness to pay." 63 Whatever the description of these the two
camps, Farber's point is undeniable: that "much of the environmental schol-
arship of the past twenty years has been dominated by the struggle between
these opposing viewpoints." 64 At rock bottom, the dispute is over the extent
to which the market should decide environmental policy issues,65 and the two
sides share only "a belief that environmental policy can be based on a single
overriding value, whether that value is economic or environmental.
66
Environmental debates are not usually cast in terms of opposing positiv-
ist philosophies, but doing so reveals much about what lies behind the rheto-
ric. As Professor Dan Tarlock has observed, the rhetoric of
environmentalism shares many traits with the post-modern, transformative
58 ECO-PRAGMATISM, supra note 4, at 6-7.
59 Id. at 39.
60 See id. at 43.
61 Id. at 42.
62 See id. at 39-41.
63 Id. at 42.
64 Id. at 35.
65 See id. at 41.
66 Id. at 9.
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theories of critical legal studies, as both seek to destabilize and redistribute
the boundaries of property and power.67 But environmentalism in practice-
that is, the way environmentalism approaches environmental law-has taken
all its cues from die-hard positivism. 68 True to the positivists' theory that
rules are communication of pre-existing binding standards, environmentalists
have stood on, not deconstructed, the rule of law as resolutely as would any
stodgy captain of industry.69 Their litigation record to uphold the law, not
change it, is impressive. 70 As Tarlock puts it, they are "thinking Unger but
pleading Hart."'71 Thus, contrary to what the respective rhetorical positions
of the bean counters and tree huggers might suggest, much of the debate in
environmental law is not between one conservative, positivist camp and one
liberal, post-modernist camp, but between two positivist extremes.
Farber is bound to attract criticism for devoting so much of his work to
drawing out this conflict, as if he is fabricating a war of values when in fact
peaceful consensus is the rule in today's environmental policy. 72 But anyone
following the Headwaters Forest controversy,73 for example, would have a
hard time thinking of Environmental Protection Information Center, the en-
vironmental group advocating for the immediate, unequivocal preservation
of the old growth redwoods, and Charles Hurwitz, whose company owns the
redwoods and who makes no apologies for thinking of them purely as a crop
commodity, as being on the same values page.
Repulsion to this narrow-minded, binary approach to environmental
policy is growing; Farber is not alone. Despite the factions, some economists
and environmentalists have been collaborating on elegant win-win ideas for
decades.74 More and more environmental law and policy scholars identify
the chasm between the bean-counting, cost-benefit-calculating, market-wor-
67 See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental "Rule of Law" Litigation, 17 PACE
ENvTL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 26-27, on file with the George Washington
Law Review).
68 See id. (manuscript at 23).
69 See id.
70 See, e.g., Nicholas Lemann, No People Allowed, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 23, 1999, at 97
(discussing accounts of a radical environmental advocacy group that uses litigation extensively to
advance its self-described anti-social goals). While writing this review, I received a "Dear
Friend" letter from Greenpeace asking for money to help the organization's battle with "the bad
guys in black hats," whom they promised me they would .""hit... with injunctions, expert testi-
mony, sound scientific research, detailed reports, on-target legislation, shareholder stratagems,
and more." See Letter from Greenpeace to Friend (undated, received by author Feb. 2, 2000)
(on file with author).
71 Tarlock, supra note 67 (manuscript at 8-9).
72 See Roe, supra note 8, at 98-99. Roe's evidence that the values war is over comes from
the declaration of a political columnist in 1990 who stated that the war was over. See id. at 99. I
have a hard time squaring the assault on environmental regulation waged by the 104th Con-
gress-five years after the columnist's declared peace-with the idea that the values war is over
in environmental policy. See Richard J. Lazarus, Fairness in Environmental Law, 27 ENvTL. L.
705, 708-10 (1997) (suggesting that fundamental normative issues remain unresolved in environ-
mental law).
73 See David . Hayes, Saving the Headwaters Forest. A Jewel that Nearly Slipped Away, 30
ENvTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10131 (2000).
74 Some recent examples are the Environmental Defense Fund's program to pay Texas
ranchers to trap cowbirds that invade nests of endangered songbirds, and the Nature Conser-
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shiping economists and the tree-hugging, neo-republican, market-hating envi-
ronmentalists as one of the most pernicious impediments to sound decision-
making.75 More importantly, concrete developments in environmental law
and policy reflect a growing intolerance for the artificial distinction between
the two extreme positions. The Department of the Interior, for example, has
forged significant administrative reforms in order to implement the Endan-
gered Species Act in practical ways that advance both economic and environ-
mental interests.76 Similarly, the emerging "sustainable development"
movement, now the official policy of the United States and many other na-
tions, explicitly fuses environment and economy, along with social equity, to
form an indivisible triad of policy goals.77 None of these or similar policy
developments, however, has avoided potshots from the extremists, 78 and it is
naive to think that the bean counters and tree huggers have called it quits.
79
For the people advocating the middle, therefore, the challenge is in defining a
way to get there that does not rely on more political annihilation. Enter eco-
pragmatism.
B. The New Pragmatic Middle
The extremists just will not seem to fade away; if anything, they continue
to drown out and define the middle. Hence, in the style of classical Ameri-
can pragmatists-always seeking the metatheoretical compatibilism between
the opposing theories-Farber methodically works through the respective
pros and cons of the two positivist ends in environmental law to find what
may become the core of a pragmatist middle, as well as what the middle
should discard. I expect that it will be this portion of the book that receives
vancy's program to supply farmers the funds to purchase low tillage equipment. See Traci Wat-
son, Environmental Groups Wielding Power of the Purse, USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 2000, at 5A.
75 See, e.g., J. Baird Callicott & Karen Mumford, Ecological Sustainability as a Conserva-
tion Concept, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 32, 34 (1997) (identifying "resourcism" and
"preservationism" as the two opposing philosophies that dominated environmental policy for the
first three quarters of the twentieth century); Marc R. Poirier, Property, Environment, Commu-
nity, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LrrsG. 43 (1997) (describing the debate as one between the "property
rights encomium" and the "environmental jeremiad"); J.B. Ruhi, Sustainable Development: A
Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31,31-35 (1999) (dis-
cussing the debate between "environmentalists" and "resourcists").
76 See J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the En-
dangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENvmL. L.J. 367 (1998).
77 See Ruhl, supra note 75, at 38-41 (providing an overview of sustainable development
policy and literature on this issue).
78 See Ruhi, supra note 76, at 386-87, 397-98 (discussing several of the Endangered Species
Act reforms and the stiff opposition they met from some environmental groups, often in the
form of litigation); Bill Willers, Sustainable Development. A New World Deception, 8 CONSERVA-
nON BIOLOGY 1146 (1994) (objecting to sustainable development because it includes economic
criteria).
79 The issue du jour has been the impact of environmental regulation on property rights.
Anyone suggesting that the bean counter/tree hugger metaphor is inappropriate simply has not
been following the vitriolic debates on that topic. Compare LAND RiGHrrs: THE 1990s PROP-
ERTY RiGrrs REBELLION (Bruce Yandel ed., 1995) (property rights attack on environmental
regulation), with LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE: WISE USE AND THE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (John D. Echeverria & Raymond Booth Eby eds., 1995) (environmentalists'
counter-attack).
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the most attention from other environmental law scholars and policy advo-
cates. The committed positivists belonging to one camp or the other will
evaluate Farber's work based on how closely it aligns with their ideology.
Where Farber praises their pet idea, they will say, "See, Farber agrees with
us!" Where Farber criticizes their idols, they will ignore him or call him
names. Farber can not win in this game with either end, because, like a good
pragmatist, he eventually finds pros and cons in both extremes. With the
bean counters and tree huggers, however, it is all or nothing; you are either
with them 100 percent or you are with the enemy.
I am not interested in regurgitating their debates. A wealth of literature
already exists in which one end espouses its agenda and trashes the other's. I
could spend weeks matching law review articles, in endless see and but see
cites, to passages in this part of Farber's book. This would simply be the liter-
ary version of the political annihilation process that eco-pragmatism intends
to replace. Which side wins, the one with more cites?80
Rather, what distinguishes Eco-pragmatism is that Farber actually comes
up with something that makes sense, is pragmatic, and could work. It in-
volves three parts, two of which fulfill the combinatorial goal of pragmatism,
with the third representing what we have learned froth the convergence of
ecosystem science and environmental pragmatism. Farber designed the pack-
age as a whole to address what he describes as the five fundamental chal-
lenges to environmental law.8' First, all decisions in environmental law
involve some trade-off between costs and benefits in terms of resource allo-
cation and social welfare. How do we know when the costs are too much to
bear relative to the benefits? Second, all decisions in environmental law ad-
dress issues to which some degree of scientific uncertainty attaches. How do
we know what to do when we do not know what will happen? Third, even if
our policy is purely economics driven, we need to establish some minimum
level of environmental protection in order to sustain the economics, and
probably more if our policy reflects additional public values. What is that
minimum level of protection? Fourth, all environmental law decisions have
consequences in the present and in the future. How should we structure our
decision process today so as to fulfill whatever goals we have for the future?
Finally, the environment, as a constantly evolving system, will not wait for us
to be perfectly happy with our answers to all the preceding questions. How
do we know when to promulgate a decision versus when to wait for more
information, input, and deliberation before deciding? Farber outlines a deci-
sion making process-a philosophy, to be more precise-that addresses these
questions in a way that would make the classical American pragmatists
proud.
80 For an account of this "my theory is better than your theory" trait of environmental law
scholarship, see Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in
Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 679-80 (1999) ("Contests to crown the best regulatory instru-
ment have been the ceaseless sport of environmental law.").
81 See ECO-PRAGMATISM, supra note 4, at 4-6, 13.
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1. Concession to Politics-The Environmental Baseline
Farber begins building his eco-pragmatic approach from the bottom up
by establishing the baseline from which all regulatory policy flows. The regu-
latory baseline can be neutral, in that it favors neither regulated entities nor
the beneficiaries of regulation, or it can favor either of those two interests.82
Although most environmental law scholarship casts this choice in normative,
outcome-driven terms, Farber's pragmatic flavor add a process dimension to
the question-i.e., it is a question of how we adopt a baseline that "leaves us
satisfied with the process of reaching the result.
'83
Farber demonstrates that pragmatism is not synonymous with neutrality
by adopting a baseline that is decidedly on the tree hugger side of the divide.
The starting point, he posits, should be the feasibility analysis currently used
throughout much of environmental law, under which we presume that envi-
ronmental risk is impermissible except when considerations of feasibility re-
quire it.84 Stated another way, environmental law pushes regulated entities
toward environmental protection until doing so further is technologically or
financially infeasible.
Farber's environmental baseline thus fulfills the concept of the "safe
minimum standard," previously forged in environmental pragmatism philoso-
phy, positing that the law should protect a natural resource unless the costs of
doing so violate a floating standard of being "immoderately high."85 This
concept, like Farber's baseline, is less rigorous than full-fledged cost-benefit
analysis in terms of the presumption in favor of the environmental protection
criterion. It is also anthropometric in that decision makers explicitly weigh
the opportunity costs of foregone alternatives in the final balance.86 Eco-
pragmatism thus is neither zero tolerance on questions of public health risk
nor total preservation on questions of the environment.
Farber concurs in the environmental pragmatists' demand for a baseline
that starts with the presumption in favor of the environment. What Farber
adds, however, is a package of legal principles to implement the calculation
of baseline. The baseline is not an outcome, but rather the result of a pro-
cess. The legal process he outlines has two important components that oper-
ate to give life to the feasibility standard. First, courts should adopt a
"green" canon of statutory construction, in which courts give statutes their
most environmentally friendly reading wherever ambiguity of text and legis-
lative intent permits.87 Second, a guiding principle for resolving questions of
doubt on all applications of the feasibility baseline should be the so-called
precautionary principle-when in doubt, exercise caution. Farber would ap-
ply this principle not based on worst-case scenarios but rather as a burden of
proof on regulated entities to demonstrate that their activities will do no
82 See id. at 98-114.
83 Id. at 113.
84 See id. at 108-14.
85 See Erwin Bulte and G.C. Van Kooten, Economic Science, Endangered Species, and
Biodiversity Loss, 14 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 113 (2000) (arguing on behalf of using the safe
minimum standard principle instead of cost-benefit analysis); Castle, supra note 53, at 246.
86 See id.
87 See ECO-PRAGMATISM, supra note 4, at 123-27.
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harm.s Although Farber acknowledges that strands of these two principles
have surfaced occasionally in environmental law,89 he calls for their explicit
and widespread adoption as central principles of environmental law and its
eco-pragmatist baseline.
2. Concession to the Market-The Cost-Benefit Backstop
As much as he defends his package of environmental baseline measures
as of primary importance to the eco-pragmatism approach, Farber joins in
others' concerns that the appeal of environmental baseline rhetoric can ob-
scure the need to keep instrumental values in sight.90 How, in other words,
do we keep the tree huggers from running the baseline up through the roof?
For this purpose, Farber turns to cost-benefit analysis "to ensure we do not
allow our commitment to environmental ideals to turn into fanaticism "91 He
describes a two-tiered implementation policy in which the baseline feasibility
analysis establishes environmental protection levels at large scales, such as
industries and regions, while cost-benefit analysis opens the door to using
efficient market-oriented instruments to implement those protections at the
local scale. In this manner, cost-benefit analysis will "assist rather than con-
trol regulatory decisions" by serving as a "critical resource to prevent mis-
guided decisions." 92 This hybridized approach pragmatically ensures that our
willingness to vote does not lose sight of our willingness and ability to pay.
After demonstrating why some level of cost-benefit analysis is needed as
a backstop to runaway politics, Farber devotes most of his attention to what
has long been the Holy Grail of environmental ethics scholarship-determin-
ing the appropriate discount rate to apply when decision makers consider
future costs and benefits in making present environmental decisions, particu-
larly when measured in the loss of or injury to future human lives. 93 The
issue pits the two warring clans at extreme ends, as it goes to the heart of
their opposing positivist foundations.94 Farber, who has covered the topic
extensively elsewhere,95 deftly walks the ethical fence in Eco-pragmatism.96
88 See id. at 170-74.
89 See, e.g., PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRE-
CAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner eds., 1999) (providing an over-
view of the precautionary principle as applied in national and international law contexts).
90 See ECO-PRAGMATISM, supra note 4, at 116-23.
91 Id. at 119.
92 Id. at 122-23.
93 See id. at 133-62. The literature on this question is legion, much of it summarized in
Eco-pragmatism. For recent influential entries, see Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic
Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-
Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999).
94 See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Environmental Ethics and Our Moral Relationship to Future Gen-
erations: Future Rights and Present Virtue, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 249, 251 (1999) ("Few issues
of environmental ethics are of greater significance than an assessment of this 'moral relation-
ship' between the present and the future."); A. Dan Tarlock, Now, Think Again About Adapta-
tion, 9 ARiz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 169, 173 (1992) ("Speculation about discount rates becomes a
disguised debate about our ethical duties toward future generations.").
95 See Daniel A. Farber and Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount
Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993).
96 Farber also completely sidesteps the other looming issue in environmental cost-benefit
[Vol 68:522
HeinOnline  -- 68 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 538 1999-2000
2000] Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle539
He favors the side of using a low discount rate not because of any grand
ethical revelation, but for the practical (of course) reason that "because our
society seems to be too present-oriented in some regards, we ought to use a
relatively low discount rate so that government can take a longer view.
'97
Other advocates of the pragmatist tradition in environmental policy have
reached much the same conclusion, calling for low discounts rates to use as
part of a cost-benefit tool that informs, but does not dominate, environmen-
tal decisions with long term impacts.98 Naturally, advocating any positive dis-
count rate will attract the ire of the tree huggers, and keeping it low runs
afoul of the bean counters' agenda. Eco-pragmatism strikes again!
3. Fusion Through Pragmatism-Dynamical Regulation
Farber's hybridization of feasibility analysis and cost-benefit balancing
calls for something other than business as usual in environmental law. A
central point in Farber's thesis is that although the hybrid approach directs us
to regulate today for a given issue, we have to be ready to revisit the question
in the future as our knowledge base improves and environmental and eco-
nomic conditions change. The costs and benefits today, as well as the what is
feasible today, will not necessarily be the case tomorrow. We will only be
able to take advantage of new knowledge that can make environmental law
sustainable if we design environmental law around a "centrality of learning to
the enterprise of environmental protection." 99 Unfortunately, environmental
law has not evolved in its short lifetime to be a particularly adept, nimble,
and inquisitive student. As Farber puts it, we are in the position of having to
raise our "regulatory IQ" and "teach the elephant how to waltz."'100
Farber's lesson plan for doing so conjoins a number of reform proposals
that a handful of federal and state environmental agencies are currently test-
ing. First, he finds much promise in the decentralization of decision making
from federal bureaucracies to more localized authorities and, ultimately, to
nonregulatory mechanisms such as the market.' 0 ' Farber recognizes that
themes of federalism and the markets play out in the bean counter/tree hug-
ger debate as surrogates for arguments about deregulation. In his hybrid
model for eco-pragmatism, however, neither form of decentralization is in-
tended to weaken regulation. Rather, decentralization could yield rapid ad-
justments to the feasibility baseline level as new knowledge flows into local
and market institutions, as well as increase rapid recalculations of costs and
benefits for the backstop. This new, nimbler form of regulation, however,
analysis-how the costs and benefits are distributed among members and groups of society. See
ECO-PRAGMATISM, supra note 4, at 14 (acknowledging that he is "putting to the side ... the
distributional issues"). Known as the "environmental justice" issue, this topic rivals the discount
rate for volume of environmental law scholarship and its controversy in practical legal applica-
tions. See KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE (1995) (anthol-
ogy of scholarly writings); TiH LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTicE (Michael B. Gerrard ed.,
1999) (survey of legal developments).
97 ECO-PRAoMATISM, supra note 4, at 162.
98 See Castle, supra note 53, at 234-48.
99 Eco-PRAMATisM, supra note 4, at 179.
100 Id.
101 See id. at 180-83.
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will only happen if we also motivate regulatory institutions toward greater
learning through as incentives for innovation, larger budgets for research and
data gathering, and other reforms that focus on how to allow regulation to
act dynamically. 1°2 Finally, Farber wants environmental regulation agencies
to have more discretion to use these learning tools to adapt without having to
obtain legislative and judicial approval at every turn. 10 3 The power to tinker
implies the freedom to experiment and to make mistakes, to make choices.
Indeed, sometimes the tinkering will lead to deregulation, or relaxation of
the baseline. Such measures are politically difficult to implement in today's
rigid, static world of environmental policy even when the evidence supports
them, but we must be willing and able to implement them in order to be eco-
pragmatic. Farber's recipe for making environmental law more dynamic thus
conforms seamlessly with the literature in ecosystem management science
and environmental pragmatism philosophy that frequently demands that
"policies... be evaluated on the basis of their capacity to take new informa-
tion into account and thereby provide for adaptation and change."'0 4
III. Applying Eco-Pragmatism in "Eco" Cases
Thus far, this book review of Eco-pragmatism has avoided mention of
one of the major features and, for me, disappointments, of the book. A
healthy portion of Farber's critique of the positivist ends and exposition on
his pragmatist middle relies on a single case for reference and elaboration.
The case, Reserve Mining Co. v. United States,05 involved the application of
common law and the Clean Water Act to a significant industrial source of air
and water pollution that injured a sizeable human population. It is famous
for setting the stage for questions of scientific uncertainty, public health risk
regulation, burdens of proof, and remedies in environmental law. Farber has
written extensively about it elsewhere, 106 and it appears as a principal case in
many environmental law case books.10 7 As an important real-world experi-
ence in environmental law, moreover, it is within the pragmatist tradition to
point to cases such as Reserve Mining for the lessons they hold. Nevertheless,
as instructive as it may be for appreciating the origins of environmental law
and the thicket of issues surrounding pollution and public health questions,
relying so heavily on Reserve Mining to convey the eco-pragmatism message
strikes me as having sold short the promise eco-pragmatism holds for envi-
ronmental law issues.
102 See id at 183-90.
103 See id. at 190-98.
104 Castle, supra note 53, at 247.
105 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
106 See Daniel A. Farber, Risk Regulation in Perspective: Reserve Mining Revisited, 21
ENvTL. L. 1321 (1991).
'107 See, e.g., PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POL.
ICY 207 (1994); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE
AND POLICY 476 (2d ed. 1996); JOHN-MARK STVENSVAAG, MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 188 (1999).
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These issues include questions that environmental law has heretofore
largely ignored, such as regulation of the agricultural, 108 consumer,109 and
services industries," 0 or questions that changing social trends have refined,
such as the transforming role of public lands"' and the increasingly global
component of environmental issues." 2 These are questions for which public
health is not the be-all and end-all of how to frame and resolve the issue.
The issues go well beyond anything considered in Reserve Mining and pre-
sent the questions that Farber used to begin his inquiry. Although the dis-
tinction exists between the public health and resource protection contexts, we
must not to take for granted that what works in one arena will work in the
other as well. As Professor Lisa Heinzerling has put it, many environmental
law debates are cast "as if the sole goal of environmental law were to protect
human health," whereas "one important purpose of environmental law is to
protect natural resources.""1
3
Oddly-remember that the title starts with eco-Farber buries that pur-
pose in Eco-pragmatism. To be fair, Farber does not purport to resolve every
question of environmental law, but rather to offer an approach for resolving
them. It is tempting to fault Eco-pragmatism for not telling us exactly how
many tons of greenhouse gas a paper mill in the United States can emit,"
4
but Farber is rightly unapologetic for going no further than describing a deci-
sion making approach. He chose to ground the approach for illustration pur-
poses in the pollution and public health setting, and does an excellent job of
demonstrating how it could apply there. But how transportable is it, really,
to the resource protection issues-habitat, endangered species, agriculture,
global warming, and the like? It is far more important to me to know how
well Farber's eco-pragmatism addresses the issues that will dominate the fu-
ture of environmental law than to know how well it explains the twenty-five
year old decision in Reserve Mining.
108 See J. B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 Eco.-
OGY L.Q. 263 (2000) (examining the environmental harms that farms cause and their exemption
from environmental regulation, and proposing a framework for affirmative environmental regu-
lation of farms).
109 See James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 24 ENV-L. L. 1243, 1248-49
(1997) (examining the historic, economic, and policy issues linking sustainable consumption and
environmental law).
110 See James Salzman, Beyond the Smokestack-- Environmental Protection in the Service
Economy, 47 UCLA L. REv. 411, 416-17 (1999) (exploring the environmental law implications
of deindustrialization and an ascendant service sector).
111 See Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 EcoL-
OGY L.Q. 140 (1999).
112 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regula-
tion, 87 GEO. L.J. 749 (1999) (discussing the content and political origins of the international
public law of environmental regulation); William L. Andreen, Environmental Law and Interna-
tional Assistance: The Challenge of Strengthening Environmental Law in the Developing World,
25 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 17 (2000) (discussing the design of domestic environmental law in devel-
oping nations).
113 Lisa Heinzerling, Reductionist Regulatory Reform, 8 FoRDrHAM ENVTL. L.J. 459, 461
(1997).
114 See, e.g., Roe, supra note 8, at 99.
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This review closes, therefore, by demonstrating that Farber's blueprint
for eco-pragmatism is indeed an appropriate and useful approach for those
questions of the future, as it synthesizes many leading edge developments in
law and science in a way that may forge a true philosophy of the middle for
environmental law. As Eco-pragmatism draws from developments in ecosys-
tem science and environmental philosophy to join eco with pragmatism in
theory, Farber's three-part implementation scheme provides the foundation
for integrating three emerging themes of environmental policy that have the
environment foremost in mind. The first, "biodiversity," fits snugly into Far-
ber's baseline component. The second, "ecosystem services," provides the
currency for cost-benefit analysis at the environmental scale. The third,
"adaptive management," puts Farber's call for dynamical regulation in mo-
tion for the complex environmental issues of the future.
A. Biodiversity as the Baseline
One unavoidable distinction between the public health context and the
environmental protection context is the metrics each one uses to establish the
feasibility baseline. Although economic and technological feasibility are the
same anthropometric scales in both contexts, environmental protection is in-
herently a biocentric matter. Public health risk measures, such as increased
cancer risk, do not work if the goal is protection of the environment. So,
when the goal is protection of the environment, what is society trying to
protect?
Environmental law, for the most part, has taken a reductionist approach
to that question, identifying discrete indicia of the environment and establish-
ing protective regimes for them. The Endangered Species Act, for example,
protects only species identified as facing a significant risk of extinction; only
incidental to that central purpose might their ecosystems benefit.115 Surely it
is feasible, however, for us to offer protection to species and their ecosystems
that are not yet in peril; indeed, it would not be eco-pragmatic to do other-
wise. The movement toward ecosystem management as the foundation for
resource protection demands a more holistic measure of environmental
health, one more like the public health risk metrics that are applicable to a
variety of conditions and locations.
Scientific research suggests that the concept of biological diversity, or
biodiversity, is the key metric of ecosystem health. Biodiversity's leading
proponent, the renowned biologist Edward 0. Wilson, describes it as "the
variety of organisms considered at all levels, from genetic variants belonging
to the same species through arrays of species to arrays of genera, families,
and still higher taxonomic levels.' 1 6 Biodiversity measures the diversity of
species in an ecosystem as an index of its health." 7 Although the relation-
ship between biodiversity and ecosystem processes is complex, researchers
115 See J. B. Ruh], Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to
Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. Rev. 933, 969-
75 (1997) (describing the Endangered Species Act as a reductionist, linear, positivist approach to
species protection).
116 EDWARD 0. WiLsoN, Ti-m DIvERSITY OF LiFE 393 (1992)
117 For an excellent introduction, see Special Issue, Biodiversity: The Fragile Web, NAT'L.
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are repeatedly finding that diversity of species assemblages is tied directly to
ecosystem productivity, resilience, and sustainability. 118 Increasingly, there-
fore, advocates of the ecosystem management approach to environmental
policy are converging on biodiversity as the measure of policy success. 1 9 Bi-
odiversity thus supplies a fitting measure for eco-pragmatism's feasibility
baseline-protect biodiversity to the maximum degree feasible.
B. Using Nature's Services in Cost-Benefit Analysis
Measuring biodiversity involves intensive scientific research, but it can
be done and projected through objective indicia of species diversity.120 At
some point, however, eco-pragmatism concedes that the costs of protecting
biodiversity may outrun the benefits by too large a factor. But how do we
assign values to the environment so that we can crunch those numbers? Far-
ber describes the difficulty that conventional environmental policy has had in
applying such cost-benefit analyses to the environmental protection con-
text. 21 Although we can argue over the value of a life and the discount rate
applied to future lives, we ultimately express these indicia of public health
risks in dollar terms. Valuation exercises in the environmental context have
proven more difficult, as the tree huggers will not concede that we can mone-
tize the environment and the bean counters concede their methods for doing
so remain clumsy.122
Once again, we find the ecosystem management movement leading to
new ways of thinking about old questions. Expressing the value of an endan-
gered blind beetle in dollar terms is an impossible and ultimately pointless
exercise, but expressing the value of the beetle's ecosystem in anthropometric
terms is not. The beetle is simply part of the ecosystem's species diversity; it
is the ecosystem we ought to be trying to protect. Additionally, ecosystems
indisputably confer value to humans through the services they provide. This
value goes well beyond the direct commodity value of ecosystem components
such as water and timber.
In the recent trail blazing book on this topic, Nature's Services, biologist
Gretchen Dailey and a host of others outline the innumerable indirect ser-
GEOGRAPHIC, February 1999. The National Geographic Society recently identified the loss of
biodiversity as one of "six subjects shaping our destiny." Id. at 5.
118 See FRAGILE DOMINION, supra note 21, at 157-67.
119 See, e.g., Laitos & Carr, supra note 111, at 195-98 (using biodiversity as the metric for
public land management); J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of
Federal Laws Regulating Private Lands, 66 U. COLO. L. Rnv. 555,557-78 (1995) (using biodivers-
ity as the metric for regulation of private lands). For an excellent overview of the use of bi-
odiversity as a protection criterion in existing law and its potential for shaping new
environmental laws, see BIODwRsrrv AND THE LAW (William J. Snape III ed., 1996).
120 The National Biological Inventory, an arm of the U.S. Geological Survey, is assisting
states in doing so through the Gap Analysis Program-a combination of field survey and com-
puter projection technology to map major indices of biodiversity over the landscape. See A.
Ross Kiester et al., Conservation Prioritization Using GAP Data, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
1332, 1333 (1996). Almost any issue of Conservation Biology includes several articles reporting
the findings of biodiversity index studies.
121 See ECO-PRAGMATISM, supra note 4, at 47-51.
122 See id at 49-51 (discussing the "contingent valuation" method).
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vices ecosystems provide to humans, including purification of air and water,
mitigation of floods and droughts, detoxification and decomposition of
wastes, soil renewal, crop pollination, pest control, climate stabilization, and
a long list of other deliverables. 123 These are not fanciful hypotheses. Envi-
ronmental science and policy advocates have pointed to this emerging body
of work as a bridge between the environment/economy divide. 24 If the bean
counters insist on making environmental decisions by way of dollars laid out
on spreadsheets, let them consider the replacement costs of these services.
25
By the same token, if the tree huggers want to preserve every last patch of
ground, let them demonstrate that the service values justify the social costs.
Eco-pragmatism thus counsels that we at least consider these ecosystem ser-
vices for their anthropometric, if not fully monetized, value when making the
cost-benefit backstop calculation.
2 6
C. Adaptive Management As Dynamical Regulation
I do not mean to suggest in my thumbnail sketches of biodiversity and
ecosystem services that implementing eco-pragmatic policies around these
two concepts will be easy. Rather, I would emphasize, as does Farber, that
implementing the baseline/backstop approach permits no simple, prefabri-
cated answers. The whole point is to feed information on biodiversity and
ecosystem services into a decision making process that is dynamic, not static.
Neither Farber nor I invented the notion of using dynamical regulation
in environmental policy. Once we appreciate ecosystem dynamics, dynamical
regulation becomes an inevitable necessity and is the essence of ecosystem
management policy. Known within that policy discipline as adaptive man-
agement, most of its advocates trace its origins to C.S. "Buzz" Holling's influ-
ential book from the late 1970s, Adaptive Environmental Assessment and
Management.127 Holling, an ecologist, probably never heard of eco-pragma-
tism, but he wrote the book on it nonetheless. Fortunately, the political sci-
entist Kai Lee later translated Holling's work for the ecosystem management
123 See NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEM'S (Gret-
chen C. Daily ed., 1997).
124 See FRAGILE DOMINION, supra note 21, at 6-7 (using NATURE'S SERVICES to introduce
the purpose of his ecosystem management theory); James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services,
24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887 (1997) (reviewing NATURE'S SERVICES and describing potential applica-
tions in environmental law).
125 See R. Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital,
387 NATURE 253 (1997) (conducting replacement cost estimates).
126 See Salzman, supra note 124, at 898-900 (suggesting that monetizing the values may be
too difficult but that other objective indicia of value could be used as surrogates in policy
decisions).
127 ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL AssESsMENT AND MANAGEMENT (Crawford S. Holling
ed., 1978). See, e.g., Kai N. Lee and Jody Lawrence, Adaptive Management: Learning from the
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431, 442 n.45 (1986) (tracing the
term to Holling's book). Holling, a University of Florida ecology professor, has continued to
advance the field of adaptive management as editor of the online ecology research magazine,
Conservation Ecology, which recently published a two-part special feature on the current state of
adaptive management theory and practice. See Special Feature on Adaptive Management, 3
CONSERVATION ECOLOGY (forthcoming June 1999 (Part I), Dec. 1999 (Part II)), available at
<http://www.consecol.org/Joumal>.
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policy wonks,128 and the biologist Simon Levin recently updated its message
for the biodiversity and ecosystem services devotees. 129 Levin defines it con-
cisely as "maintaining flexibility in management structures and adjusting
rules and regimes on the basis of monitoring and other sources of new
data."'130 It is learning by doing and doing by learning. Like Farber's dynam-
ical regulation, it puts a premium on collecting information, establishing mea-
surements of success, monitoring outcomes, using new information to adjust
existing approaches, and a willingness to change. It has evolved well beyond
an idea. The Department of the Interior recently announced that it will
henceforth administer permits under the Endangered Species Act, where
gaps in information run high, using adaptive management to "examine alter-
native strategies for meeting measurable biological goals and objectives
through research and/or monitoring, and then, if necessary, to adjust future
conservation management actions according to what is learned.'' 1 Al-
though the lay person might reasonably have assumed that was how things
ran already, sadly that has not been the case. This is new ground for environ-
mental law.
A broader commitment to adaptive management throughout resource
protection institutions would allow greater collection and use of biodiversity
and economic system services information to guide adaptive dynamical deci-
sionmaking in law. All the ingredients are bubbling up in research, theory,
and application. Farber has helped synthesize and translate the policy for
law, albeit without making the explicit connections I have drawn in this re-
view. If we are faulted for being light on the details, my excuse again is that
we are advocating an approach, not answers. The approach, eco-pragmatism,
strikes me as having more promise of integrating the biodiversity, ecosystem
services, and adaptive management themes for resource protection than any
other out there.
IV. Conclusion: Pragmatism in Need of Passion
I am a fan of eco-pragmatism, and of Eco-pragmatism. I fault Farber
only for omissions. He could have done more to link his framework with the
burgeoning literature in ecosystem management and environmental pragma-
tism. He could have done more to exhibit eco-pragmatism's bond with the
emerging themes in resource protection policy of biodiversity, ecosystem ser-
vices, and adaptive management. It is hard to say, however, that he could
have done more to describe the philosophical divide that has dominated envi-
128 See KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE (1993). See also Kai N. Lee, Appraising
Adaptive Management, 3 CONSERVATION ECOLOGY (Dec. 1999), available at <http:II
www.consecol.org/Journal/vol3/iss2/art3>.
129 See FRAGILE DOMINION, supra note 21, at 198-206. See also Simon A. Levin, Towards a
Science of Ecological Management, 3 CONSERVATON ECOLOGY (Dec. 1999), available at http://
vww.consecol.org/Journal/vol3/iss2/art6>.
130 FRAGILE DOMINION, supra note 21, at 200.
131 Notice of Availability of a Draft Addendum to the Final Handbook for Habitat Conser-
vation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 64 Fed. Reg. 11485, 11486 (Mar. 9,
1999).
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ronmental policy for decades, or to suggest how pragmatism can build a new
philosophy of the middle.
If I would fault Farber for anything else, it would be for a lack of pas-
sion. This applies to all those in the middle, including me. Having a philoso-
phy does not alone make one passionate. Not once does Farber raise his
literary voice or pound a figurative fist on the table. His big risk is calling
some people bean counters or tree huggers. He threatens no one, issues no
ultimatums, and files no lawsuits. Nor does anyone in the middle. We press
on, stay at the negotiating table, and look for common ground. We do not
sue, we get sued. One has to hand it to the bean counters and tree huggers,
for at least they are passionate. Maybe pragmatism does not lend itself well
to being passionate. Maybe passion itself is not a pragmatic virtue. But why
is that-why is no one willing to lie down in the road in the name of being
pragmatic?
A political satirist, I can not remember which, once quipped that he was
so committed to being in the middle that he ordered his shirts in size extra-
medium. If there is such a size for environmental policy, Eco-pragmatism is a
good start at cutting the cloth of its philosophical underpinnings. If the mid-
dle now has a philosophy in the form of eco-pragmatism, it is also time for
the middle to get religion.
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